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LOW EXPECTATIONS: HOW CHANGING EXPECTATIONS
OF PRIVACY CAN ERODE FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Teri Dobbins Baxter∗
Technology has changed the lives of every American, but it has revolutionized the
way that young people socialize and become socialized. Youths’ increasing use of
technology to interact with their peers and shape their identities has led to a change in
the way personal information is shared and the privacy expectations that are held with
respect to that information. Various studies have found that, in general, younger
generations have lower privacy expectations than their older counterparts. This Article
considers how these changing attitudes towards privacy among youth have the
potential to erode Fourth Amendment protection for everyone. The Article then
proposes modest changes to the current test for Fourth Amendment protection that take
into consideration the changes in society brought about by rapidly developing
technology. Specifically, the Article proposes a test that asks: (1) whether a person has
taken steps to reasonably limit access to the information or place targeted for search
or seizure; and (2) if so, whether society is prepared to protect the information or
space from government intrusion.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Technology has changed the way people live their lives. Many of these changes
are for the better: advances in medical technology have saved lives; technology has led
to safer cars, faster and more powerful computers, and the ability to communicate with
others around the world instantly and relatively cheaply. But technology has also
∗
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brought about significant cultural shifts. One prominent example is the way that
people, particularly young people, socialize and become socialized.
Youth may spend almost as much time interacting with their peers and others via
technological devices as they spend in face-to-face interactions. This has led to a
change in the way personal information is shared and the privacy expectations that are
held with respect to that information. In general, younger generations have lower
privacy expectations than their older counterparts. This Article considers how changing
attitudes towards privacy have the potential to erode Fourth Amendment protection for
everyone. The Article then proposes changes to the current test for Fourth Amendment
protection that take into consideration the changes in society brought about by rapidly
developing technology.
The current test for Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search or
seizure asks whether there is a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to accept as reasonable.1 After a brief discussion in Part II of the development of the
Fourth Amendment to its current state, Part III of this Article explores the varying
subjective expectations of privacy among different age groups. It discusses
expectations of youth and how those expectations may differ markedly from the
expectations of more senior Americans.
Part III also examines how the younger generation may impact Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the future. Fourth Amendment litigation involving new
technologies and new uses of existing technology has already begun, and courts are
defining privacy rights in these arenas, often cautiously—even reluctantly—and
sometimes inconsistently. It is undisputed that technology is advancing at an
extraordinary pace; and younger generations are leading the way in embracing and
utilizing these technologies. Moreover, youth are driving and influencing what and how
technology develops and how it is used, since they are the biggest market for such
technology. As a result, youth are in a position to affect the development of privacy law
in a way that is unprecedented.
Part IV then considers how differing expectations of privacy could lead to
different levels of protection for people in varying age groups. In a Fourth Amendment
case, the courts could find the subjective part of the test satisfied for some individuals,
particularly older individuals, and not for others. Thus, older litigants could be afforded
greater protection than their younger counterparts in the same circumstances.
Alternatively, in the near term, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could be skewed to
reflect the expectations of older Americans while evolving over time to reflect younger
perceptions, resulting in less protection.
Part V focuses on the objective component of the current Fourth Amendment test.
When courts ask whether a person’s expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable, which segments of society’s expectations are
considered? Given that judges—particularly Supreme Court Justices—tend to be older,
one could assume that their own expectations will prevail or will at least be given a
great deal of weight. This Article examines recent cases to assess the accuracy of that

1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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assumption. Part V also questions whether courts should favor those who want greater
protection in cases in which the expectations of various groups are inconsistent.
Next, Part VI identifies legislative responses to technology and its effect on
privacy rights. Both federal and state statutes limit the government and private parties’
ability to use technology to gain access to private information. This Part further
discusses the limits to the effectiveness of legislation as a means of protecting privacy.
Finally, Part VII proposes a new test—which is simply a variant of the current
test—for Fourth Amendment protection that does not include an absolute subjective
expectation of privacy. This proposed test narrows the objective inquiry to focus on
whether society is willing to protect the information or place from government
intrusion, as opposed to whether society is willing to recognize a more general
expectation of privacy. This new test would acknowledge the reality that absolute
privacy is almost impossible to maintain in today’s society, and would not require
people to choose between fully participating in society, particularly areas involving
technology, or protecting themselves from government searches or seizures.
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLICATION: PAST AND PRESENT

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”2 The test adopted by the Supreme Court
for Fourth Amendment protection has both a subjective and an objective component.3
The first part of the test asks whether the target of the search or seizure has a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object, area, or information to be searched or seized.4 If a
subjective expectation of privacy is found, the court then asks whether society is
prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.5 This has been characterized as an
objective inquiry.6
This test has been used for the last forty years to decide Fourth Amendment
cases.7 In that time, courts have had the sometimes difficult task of applying the test in
the context of new and developing technologies. The foundation for more recent cases
was laid in cases addressing more familiar technology, such as the telephone. In Smith
v. Maryland,8 the Court considered whether a pen register attached to a suspect’s home
telephone at the government’s request and without a warrant was an unreasonable
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.9 The Court held that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation because the pen register was not a search; there was no search

2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
7. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211
(1986); Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
8. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
9. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736–38.
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because telephone users have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers that
they dial, even from their home telephone.10
The Court reasoned that telephone users know that the telephone company has
access to and can record the numbers that they dial for legitimate business purposes.11
“Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to
believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”12 Without an objectively
reasonable subjective expectation of privacy, the pen register could not violate the
Fourth Amendment.13 Moreover, even if the user could prove a subjective expectation
of privacy, it would not be objectively reasonable since the user must voluntarily
disclose the dialing information to the telephone company in order to complete the
call.14 “This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”15 The Court’s
conclusion in Smith relied heavily on the assumption that telephone users understand
how the telephone service works and that the telephone company has access to dialing
information.16 Technology has advanced rapidly and tremendously since Smith was
decided and the Court has had to address circumstances in which the mechanics of the
technology at issue are not as well known to, or as easily understood by, the general
population.
In Kyllo v. United States,17 the defendant challenged a search of his home by
government officers using thermal imaging technology.18 In that case, an agent of the
Department of the Interior suspected that the petitioner was growing marijuana in his
home.19 In order to confirm his suspicions, the agent used a thermal imaging device to
detect whether the petitioner’s home was producing more heat than would be expected,
or more than surrounding homes, to support his theory that the petitioner was using
heat lamps to grow the marijuana indoors.20 The readings were taken from the streets in
front of and behind the petitioner’s home and showed higher than normal heat radiating
from the structure.21 Based upon this and other evidence, a search warrant was issued
for petitioner’s home and evidence of marijuana growing was collected.22 The
petitioner challenged the validity of the warrant, complaining that the thermal imaging
constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.23 The district
court rejected the petitioner’s claim, finding that the imaging did not show any people

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 742–44.
Id.
Id. at 743 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Id.
Id. at 743–44.
Id.
Id. at 742–44.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
Id.
See id. at 30.
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or activities in the home, did not capture any conversations or intimate details of the
home, and showed only crude visual heat images.24 Based on its findings, the district
court upheld the warrant and denied the motion to suppress.25 The court of appeals
affirmed.26
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.27 The Court began its discussion with
recognition that warrantless searches of homes have been held, with few exceptions, to
violate the Fourth Amendment.28 As technology has developed, however, the Court had
several opportunities to address when a search has taken place for Fourth Amendment
purposes:29
As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. We have
subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment search
does not occur—even when the explicitly protected location of a house is
concerned—unless “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search,” and “society [is] willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable.”30
Applying this test, the Court held that no search occurred in Smith v. Maryland, even
though the pen register recorded numbers dialed from the suspect’s home,31 and later
held that aerial surveillance of a home and its surrounding property did not constitute a
search even though technology (flight) allowed government officials to view what had
previously been private.32
Kyllo presented the Court with a slightly different set of circumstances because
the officers did not merely observe the petitioner’s home with their naked eyes. Instead,
sense-enhancing technology allowed the officers to observe what would not have been
apparent without the technology.33 The Court made note that
[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the
advance of technology. . . . The question we confront today is what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy.34

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 30–31. A divided court initially reversed but later withdrew its opinion and affirmed. Id.
27. Id. at 31.
28. Id. at 31.
29. See id. at 33 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743–44 (1979)) (discussing cases in which the Court determined that the aerial surveillance of one’s
home and surrounding area was not a search, nor was the use of a pen register to obtain the numbers dialed
from one’s home).
30. Id. at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211).
31. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741, 743–44. See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text for a more in-depth
discussion of Smith.
32. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209, 213–14.
33. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30.
34. Id. at 33–34.
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The Court noted that although the Katz test may be difficult to apply in some
circumstances,35 ample precedent exists for finding that a subjective and reasonable
expectation of privacy exists inside of homes.36 The Court held that the warrantless use
of thermal imaging to gather information about activities inside of the home constituted
an unreasonable search.37 “Where . . . the Government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”38 The language of the opinion implies
that if a device is in general public use, the Court may not find that a search has
occurred (or, alternatively, that the search was reasonable). Given the rapid pace of
technological development and the degree to which technology formerly available only
to governments and universities is now available to the general public, the protection
formerly provided by the Court in Kyllo may be significantly eroded today.
After Kyllo, the Court’s attention moved from government surveillance of
physical spaces to computer searches. In 1986 the Court addressed the Fourth
Amendment’s application to searches of the work computers of government
employees.39 The Court confirmed that government employees have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their workplace,40 but went on to note that the expectation of
privacy may be diminished in shared spaces or in light of the legitimate need for access
by coworkers or supervisors.41 Consequently, whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists in a particular circumstance must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.42
Having concluded that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the Court then
had to determine whether a search of an employee’s private area is reasonable.43 In
order to answer that question, the Court was first tasked with determining the
appropriate standard of reasonableness to be applied to searches of government
workplaces.44
[W]e conclude that the ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement make the . . . probable-cause requirement impracticable . . . .
We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally
protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory,
work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related

35. See id. at 34 (citing criticisms of the Katz test as circular and unpredictable, particularly as applied to
surveillance of phone booths, automobiles, or the area surrounding residences).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 40.
38. Id.
39. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
40. Id. at 717.
41. Id. at 717–18.
42. Id. at 718.
43. Id. at 719.
44. Id.
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misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances.45
Under this test, a court must first determine that the search was reasonable at the
inception, and, second, that the scope of the actual search was reasonable.46
This test was applied to a search of a public university employee’s computer in
Biby v. Board of Regents.47 In that case, the employee claimed that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the files on his work computer and that a search of the
computer by university employees violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.48
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
university, finding that the employee had not established a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his computer files. This finding was based, in part, on a university computer
policy which allowed for searches of university computers in response to a discovery
request in litigation.49
The courts of appeals have also begun to address the application of the Fourth
Amendment to electronic communications such as email. In United States v.
Warshak,50 the Sixth Circuit held that people usually have a subjective expectation of
privacy in the content of their emails that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.51
The court began its Fourth Amendment analysis by noting the protection granted to
“traditional forms of communication,” such as letters and telephone calls.52 Courts have
found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of those communications
notwithstanding the fact that intermediaries such as mail carriers and the telephone
company have the ability (and sometimes the right) to intercept such
communications.53 In Katz, the Court held that telephone conversations are protected
by the Fourth Amendment because callers were “surely entitled to assume that the
words [they] utter[ed] into the mouthpiece w[ould] not be broadcast to the world.”54
Similarly, with respect to letters, the Sixth Circuit stated “trusting a letter to an
intermediary does not necessarily defeat a reasonable expectation that the letter will
remain private.”55
The Sixth Circuit noted that email has assumed a “prominent role” in modern
communication.56
Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have waned in
importance, and an explosion of Internet-based communication has taken

45. Id. at 725–26 (omission in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
46. Id. at 726 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967)).
47. 419 F.3d 845, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2005).
48. Biby, 419 F.3d at 850.
49. Id. at 850–51.
50. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
51. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
52. Id. at 285.
53. Id.
54. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 284.
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place. People are now able to send sensitive and intimate information,
instantaneously, to friends, family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers
exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with
the click of a mouse button. Commerce has also taken hold in email. . . . In
short, “account” is an apt word for the conglomeration of stored messages
that comprises an email account, as it provides an account of its owner’s
life.57
Finding strong similarities between email and traditional forms of communication,
and in light of the role email plays in today’s society, the court held that “common
sense” dictated providing equal Fourth Amendment protection to email.58
Consequently, government officials seeking access to email must comply with the
warrant requirement unless some recognized exception applies.59 “As some forms of
communication begin to diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect
nascent ones that arise.”60
The Ninth Circuit reached similar conclusions in United States v. Forrester.61 In
that case, the government conducted warrantless computer surveillance that allowed it
to discover “the to/from addresses of [the defendant’s] e-mail messages, the IP
addresses of the websites that [the defendant] visited and the total volume of
information sent to or from [the defendant’s] account.”62 The defendant claimed that
the surveillance violated his Fourth Amendment rights.63 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
reasoning that the surveillance conducted by the government was “constitutionally
indistinguishable” from the pen register that was approved by the Supreme Court in
Smith v. Maryland.64 Similar to telephone numbers that are provided to the phone
company in order to facilitate the call, email addresses are voluntarily provided to the
email service provider to enable the messages to be routed to the intended recipient.65
Likewise, the court found email addresses identical to addresses on physical mail for
constitutional purposes; both may be “searched” without a warrant.66
Although the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the address
information, it distinguished addresses from the content of the email.67
E-mail, like physical mail, has an outside address “visible” to the third-party
carriers that transmit it to its intended location, and also a package of content
that the sender presumes will be read only by the intended recipient. The
57. Id.
58. Id. at 285–86.
59. Id. at 286.
60. Id. But note that courts have held that government surveillance of IP addresses visited, “to/from
addresses” on emails, and the “total volume of information sent to or from” an email account does not violate
the Fourth Amendment. E.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 n.4, 511 (9th Cir. 2008).
61. 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
62. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 505.
63. Id. at 509.
64. Id. at 510 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742, 744 (1979)).
65. Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742).
66. Id. at 511 (noting that cases dating back to the nineteenth century have held that the government may
not conduct warrantless searches of the contents of mail but may observe information printed on the outside of
letters or packages).
67. Id.
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privacy interests in these two forms of communication are identical. The
contents may deserve Fourth Amendment protection, but the address and
size of the package do not.68
Whereas lower courts have tackled Fourth Amendment issues related to
technology, the United States Supreme Court does not seem as comfortable with these
issues as some of the courts of appeals. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
address the issue of privacy in text messages sent using government-issued electronic
devices in City of Ontario v. Quon.69 In that case, a police officer claimed that his
employer, the police department, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining
and reading transcripts of text messages he sent and received using the wireless pager
issued to him by the police department.70 The department’s computer usage policy
stated that “[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using
these resources.”71 However, a supervisor told Officer Quon that he would not audit the
messages if Quon paid for any usage that exceeded the monthly allotment.72
The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals both found that the
officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages in spite of the
computer policy,73 presumably finding that the statements and subsequent actions of
the supervisor overrode the written policy.74 The district court nevertheless held that
the search of the text messages was reasonable and therefore did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.75 The court of appeals reversed that ruling, and held that the search was
unreasonable in scope.76
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the case “touche[d]
issues of farreaching significance,” but determined that the Fourth Amendment
question could be resolved without deciding whether the officer had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the text messages.77 When addressing privacy expectations in
this context, the Court counseled restraint:
The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of
privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment
owned by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating
too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
before its role in society has become clear. In Katz, the Court relied on its
own knowledge and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a telephone booth. It is not so clear that courts at
present are on so sure a ground. Prudence counsels caution before the facts
in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625–26.
Id. at 2625.
Id.
Id. at 2626–27.
See id. at 2629.
Id. at 2626–27.
Id. at 2627 (citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 908 (9th Cir. 2008)).
See id. at 2624.
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existence, and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when
using employer-provided communication devices.
....
A broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis
employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for
future cases that cannot be predicted. It is preferable to dispose of this case
on narrower grounds.78
The Court not only appeared concerned about the continued evolution of
technology and its impact on privacy expectations, it also seemed skeptical about the
judiciary’s understanding of such technology. Unlike the telephone booth, with which
the Katz Justices were familiar, emerging technology may be beyond the experience
and understanding of members of the judiciary.79 Lacking a firm understanding, courts
might not feel confident deciding what expectations are reasonable, at least not without
input from other sources. The Court’s admitted discomfort opens the door to
discussions of the varying and shifting expectations of privacy among different
segments of society.
III. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS
Much research has been done examining how people of various ages view
privacy. Some concerns exist across generations. For instance, both older and younger
users may not sufficiently understand how the technology works to realize the privacy
implications of using the technology.80 Privacy controls are not always transparent; it
may not be clear what information is private and what is publicly available.81 For

78. Id. at 2629–30 (citations omitted).
79. For instance, Chief Justice Roberts asked at oral argument: “Maybe—maybe everybody else knows
this, but what is the difference between a pager and e-mail?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 29:18–20, City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332). See also id. at 44:16–18 (Justice Kennedy, in trying to
determine what happens when a person receives a text message while simultaneously receiving one from
another device, wondering if there would be “a voice mail saying that your call is very important to us; we’ll
get back to you”); id. at 49:20–22 (Justice Scalia inquiring if one could print out text messages received on a
mobile device).
80. See Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My) Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 76, 78 (2007) (noting that although social network privacy expectations
“seem to be overwhelmingly generation specific,” both younger (“digital natives”) and older (“digital
immigrants”) generations are “fundamentally mistaken” in their assumptions about social network privacy).
81. See Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Creation: Teenagers’ Use of
Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and Self-Expression, 10 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 393, 408 (2008)
(finding that risks may exist through “poorly designed site settings” that make it unclear as to who can see
what information on the site); Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal
Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 121–23
(2009) (noting that users rarely read privacy policies, that such policies are often confusing, and that personal
information can be collected passively, without the user’s knowledge); cf. ANDREW FRACKMAN ET AL.,
INTERNET AND ONLINE PRIVACY 19–22 (2002) (discussing a variety of ways in which information is passively
collected on the internet); danah boyd, Why Youth ⁄ Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 131 (David Buckingham ed., 2008)
(discussing how teens envision an online audience that is connected to their social world offline, but “their
audience online may not be who they think it is”); Julia B. Earp et al., Examining Internet Privacy Policies
Within the Context of User Privacy Values, 52 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ENG’G MGMT. 227, 233–34 (2005)
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example, a Facebook user may believe that his profile is only available to a limited
number of people, and would be surprised to realize that the profile—and all of the
information included on the profile—was available to anyone with a Facebook
account.82 Thus, the user may have a subjective expectation of privacy even though that
expectation is inconsistent with reality.
Although both older and younger users may be misinformed about who has access
to their posted information, older users are more likely to be distressed to learn the
truth.83 This is because younger users may view the sites differently.84 Younger users
may view the sites as a means of maintaining contact with existing friends and making
new friends—expanding their social networks.85 This view is consistent with the intent
of the Facebook founders and the concept of social networking sites.86 Consequently,
these younger users may not be surprised or distressed to learn that their profiles are
available to a wider audience than originally intended. Or, if they are distressed, it is
due to concerns about access by their parents or other known individuals rather than the
government or a stranger’s access.87 On the other hand, older individuals may be

(discussing a study concluding that website privacy policy content does not reflect user privacy values and
may result in a loss of users’ trust in organizations); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “BlurryEdged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1328–29 (2009) (noting that sites like Facebook create an
“aura of privacy,” but that site features and social pressures incent disclosure, making it “increasingly
challenging to maintain” limited disclosure); Yasamine Hashemi, Note, Facebook’s Privacy Policy and Its
Third-Party Partnerships: Lucrativity and Liability, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 140, 144–146 (2009)
(discussing Facebook user protest over Facebook’s third-party partnerships, which made profile information
public without many users being aware).
82. See danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship,
13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 222 (2008) (discussing a “privacy paradox,” which occurs because
students may desire to protect their online privacy but are unaware of the public nature of the social network
sites).
83. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1179–81 (2009) (suggesting that
teenagers may be aware of risks, but are “notorious risk-takers” and therefore may not recognize the later
consequences of disclosing personal information online); William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and
Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1126 (2009) (stating that younger users have a more
relaxed opinion about online information privacy); Kim Bartel Sheehan, Toward a Typology of Internet Users
and Online Privacy Concerns, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 21, 30 (2002) (finding that “alarmed Internet users”—those
who “are highly concerned about their privacy online”—tend to be older and more educated).
84. Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 1179–81 (discussing the “divergence in privacy norms between
heavily wired teens and their parents”).
85. See Nicole B. Ellison et al., The Benefits of Facebook “Friends”: Social Capital and College
Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1143, 1143, 1155 (2007)
(noting that users may utilize social network sites to meet new people and reporting a study finding a “slight
tendency for newer [college] students to use Facebook to meet new people”); Emily Nussbaum, Say
Everything, N.Y. MAG., http://nymag.com/news/features/27341 (last visited May 26, 2012) (interviewing
social network site users who disclose personal information to the public in order to have fun, show their
creativity, stay connected with friends, and meet strangers).
86. See Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook, Answering Privacy Concerns with New Settings, WASH.
POST (May 24, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR201005230382
8.html (Facebook’s founder stating: “Six years ago, we built Facebook around a few simple ideas. People want
to share and stay connected with their friends and the people around them. . . . If people share more, the world
will become more open and connected. And a world that’s more open and connected is a better world”).
87. Livingstone, supra note 81, at 405 (“[B]eing visible to strangers . . . is not so much a concern . . . as
that of being visible to known but inappropriate others – especially parents.”); see also boyd, supra note 81, at
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dismayed at the thought of those that they do not know having access to their
information.88
Although some privacy concerns are consistent across age groups, research has
shown that youth generally have significantly lower expectations of privacy than
adults.89 This may be the result of several factors. First, they have much less control
over most aspects of their lives.90 They are subject to the rules and restrictions of their
parents or guardians, school officials, and other adults. At home they may not have
complete control over access to their physical spaces (such as bedrooms) and may have
no choice but to allow parental monitoring of their phone and computer usage.91 At
school, backpacks, desks, and lockers may be subject to inspection.92 In short, youth
are unable to claim the same level or privacy that adults enjoy.
Professor Seounmi Youn conducted a study in 2002 that collected responses from
326 Midwest public high school students.93 Based on the students’ responses to the
survey, Professor Youn found that teens were concerned with protecting their privacy,
and that the teens conducted risk and benefit appraisals to determine whether to
disclose information online.94 The higher the perceived risk associated with the
disclosure, the less likely the teens were to disclose personal information.95 If,
however, the teens believed that the disclosure would result in a benefit, they were
more willing to disclose personal information.96 Moreover, the data indicated that teens
131–32, 134–35 (noting that many teens engage in deceptive tactics online in order to “protect themselves
from the watchful eye of parents”).
88. See Abril, supra note 80, at 76–78 (discussing how digital immigrants view privacy in terms of
control, but do not understand technology well enough to realize that even if they originally control disclosure
of personal information online, this information can be disseminated throughout the online world); cf.
Livingstone, supra note 81, at 404 (“[S]ocial networking sites typically display as standard precisely the
information that previous generations often have regarded as private . . . .”).
89. Sheehan, supra note 83 (finding in a study that younger, less-educated internet users have the lowest
privacy concern whereas younger, better-educated internet users have a slightly more moderate level of
privacy concern compared with older users); see also McGeveran, supra note 83, at 1126 (“[U]sers of social
networks, especially younger users, simply have particularly relaxed preferences about information privacy.”).
90. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (explaining that “juveniles have less control, or less
experience with control, over their own environment”).
91. See boyd, supra note 81, at 134–35 (“For many teens, home is a highly regulated space with rules
and norms that are strictly controlled by adults.”). Many teens also engage in deceptive tactics online in order
to “protect themselves from the watchful eye of parents.” Id. at 131–32; see also Eszter Hargittai, Whose
Space? Differences Among Users and Non-Users of Social Network Sites, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM.
276, 291 (2008) (finding that students who live at home with their parents tend to use Facebook less than those
who live with roommates or alone, reasoning that parents could put limits on their Internet use, that students
who live with parents may have less time online if they have to share the computer, or that students who live at
home know less of their peers so have less interest in following them online).
92. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342, 346–48 (1985) (holding that a search for
cigarettes that subsequently found marijuana in a student’s purse by a school official was permissible in scope
because the measures were reasonably related to the search objectives and were not intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student).
93. Seounmi Youn, Teenagers’ Perceptions of Online Privacy and Coping Behaviors: A Risk-Benefit
Appraisal Approach, 49 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 86, 95–96 (2005).
94. Id. at 104.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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were likely to downplay possible risks of disclosure and that “benefit perception was
more important than risk perception in predicting teenagers’ willingness to disclose
information.”97 The study did reveal attempts by teens to protect themselves by
providing false or incomplete information, thus allowing them to receive the promised
benefits while minimizing disclosure of true personal information.98
Additionally, technological literacy may play a role in risk assessment. By the
time children reach adolescence they may have a greater understanding than their adult
counterparts of how technology works.99 Kids today are exposed to technology at a
very young age, and they tend to be comfortable with technology.100 They may have a
higher level of comprehension of the many systems involved, the many people who
have access to those systems, and the information that is transmitted using the
technology.101 They know that the information they send using their cell phones or post
or submit on the internet is available to people they do not know.102 Consequently, they
do not suffer from the misconception that their privacy is absolute when they are on a
cell phone or use a computer.103
Not only do young people understand their lack of privacy, they are less likely to
be concerned about it.104 Never having had a great deal of privacy, they feel no sense of

97. Id.
98. Id. at 104. But see Alyson L. Young & Anabel Quan-Haase, Information Revelation and Internet
Privacy Concerns on Social Network Sites: A Case Study of Facebook, 4 INT’L CONF. ON COMMUNITIES &
TECHNOLOGIES 265, 270–71 (2009) (finding that university students used fake or inaccurate information less
frequently than other strategies as an online protective measure).
99. See Curt J. Dommeyer & Barbara L. Gross, What Consumers Know and What They Do: An
Investigation of Consumer Knowledge, Awareness, and Use of Privacy Protection Strategies, 17 J.
INTERACTIVE MKTG. 34, 47 (2003) (finding that men and younger people in research study were more aware
of privacy protection strategies); Youn, supra note 93, at 86, 89 (discussing how teenagers today grew up with
the Internet and are more knowledgeable about it, often having to coach their parents about how to use the
Internet).
100. See Abril, supra note 80, at 76–77 (describing the younger generation as “digital natives” because
they grew up with the Internet and are therefore “cyber-savvy”); Youn, supra note 93, at 86, 89 (noting that
“about 75% of 14- to 17-year-olds and 65% of 10- to 13-year-olds used the Internet in 2001” and that “there is
general agreement that today’s teenagers are knowledgeable and literate with the Internet”).
101. Cf. Abril, supra note 80, at 76–77 (asserting that “digital natives’ complex expectations of privacy
on OSNs rest on a combination of technology, the anonymity of the multitude, and assumptions about the
presence of their unintended audiences”); Dommeyer & Gross, supra note 99, at 47–49 (finding that men and
younger people are more aware of and likely to use privacy protections).
102. See Livingstone, supra note 81, at 404 (“[T]eenagers may disclose personal information with up to
several hundred people known only casually.”).
103. See Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Information Revelation and Privacy in Online Social
Networks, 2005 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC SOC’Y 71, 72–73, 79–80 (providing
research suggesting that university students were aware that privacy settings were present, but chose to
disclose personal information in order to receive the benefits of public disclosure); Nussbaum, supra note 85
(interviewing social network site users who disclose personal information to the public because it’s fun, allows
them to be creative, keeps them connected with friends, and helps them meet strangers).
104. Gail Salaway et al., The ECAR Study of Undergraduate Students and Information Technology,
2008, 8 EDUCAUSE CENTER FOR APPLIED RES. 91–93 (2008) (finding through a research study of students
that “[o]verall, [social network site] users do not appear to be overly concerned about privacy and security
issues”); Sheehan, supra note 83, at 30 (finding in a study that younger, less-educated internet users have the
lowest privacy concern, whereas younger, better-educated internet users have a slightly more moderate level of
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loss—they cannot miss what they never had. Moreover, they may not feel any need for
greater privacy. Whereas they might like to keep things private from their parents, they
may not feel the need to protect information from peers or strangers.105 They may be
unable to anticipate the ways in which the information that they disseminate now may
be used to their disadvantage in the future. For adolescents, the possibility that the
information they post on a social network site will hurt their chances of getting into
their college of choice or landing the job of their dreams may be too remote to change
their beliefs or behavior.106 Finally, they may like the idea that they can access
information about other people; in other words, their desire to protect their own privacy
may be overridden by their desire to invade the privacy of others.107
These “digital natives”108 may seem reckless to the older generation (“digital
immigrants”), but Professor Abril argues that digital natives are cognizant of privacy
issues and are willing to protest when they believe their privacy rights have been
violated.109 Abril further notes that young internet users’ “complex expectations of
privacy” on online social networks may be explained in part by a feeling of “anonymity
of the multitude.”110 Although they know that their activities can be viewed by others
in cyberspace, they believe that no one is focused on them or knows them (other than
their friends) and that this anonymity protects them.111 Professor Abril draws an
analogy to drivers who engage in private behavior in their cars knowing that other
drivers and pedestrians can see them but feel a false sense of privacy because they
believe that no one is focused on them; and, if they are, they are unlikely to recognize
or ever see them again.112
privacy concern compared with older users); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 1179–81 (discussing
the “divergence in privacy norms between heavily wired teens and their parents”); McGeveran, supra note 83,
at 1126 (stating that younger users have a relaxed opinion about online information privacy and believe that
people who do not like sharing personal information should not participate in online social networks).
105. Livingstone, supra note 81, at 405 (describing teenagers’ attitude toward online disclosure as one
where there is little concern with strangers but a preference against disclosing unintended information to
people they know—especially parents).
106. See boyd, supra note 81, at 133 (discussing teens facing expulsions from school and legal
investigations for content on their MySpace pages, which they presented in order to relate to their perceived
audience (peers), without regard for their invisible audiences); Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 1179 (“Later
regret about initial openness is an especially serious problem for the most active social-network site users:
young people.”).
107. See boyd, supra note 81, at 122 (noting reasons for youth joining social networking sites are to
engage in “social voyeurism” and to create an online persona); Adam N. Joinson, ‘Looking at’, ‘Looking up’
or ‘Keeping up with’ People? Motives and Uses of Facebook, 26 CHI. CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 1027, 1034–35 (2008) (finding that a subset of Facebook users wishing to use the site to meet new
people often employ privacy settings less stringent than the default).
108. Abril, supra note 80, at 76 (adopting the terminology coined by John Palfrey, Jr., Commentary, We
Googled You, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2007, at 42).
109. See id. at 76 n.18 (describing protests by Facebook users when the site introduced new features that
users perceived as privacy violations).
110. Id. at 77.
111. See id. (“While young digitals know on some level that their online behavior is ultimately subject to
the unforgiving scrutiny of the Internet, they demand the right to exercise their situational personalities and
still be shielded from unintended audiences. Theirs is a conception of privacy rooted in their perceived
entitlement of selective anonymity.”).
112. Id. at 76–77.
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Although this diminished sense of privacy among youth may not be new, the
consequences may be more far-reaching. The attitudes that youth have toward online
privacy may persist into adulthood, causing a shift in the privacy attitudes of society as
a whole. If youth become comfortable with the idea that information shared online or
via cell phones is not private, and that belief continues as they grow older, the result
may be that in future decades older adults (today’s youth) will have diminished privacy
expectations.
To understand why this view of the future is plausible, one must understand why
older adults currently view privacy differently. They are more likely to think of privacy
as it relates to physical spaces, such as their homes or cars,113 and they think of privacy
protection in terms of control.114 Privacy in that context can be protected using physical
barriers or by excluding people from those areas, and by hiding or destroying physical
evidence of their activities.115
Their era gave them the opportunity to successfully rewrite their personal
histories through legal and social mechanisms: criminal records could be
expunged, foolish marriages could be annulled, shameful teenage
pregnancies could be covered up by “moving away,” and all was forgotten.
In their youth, newspapers yellowed and memories failed, leaving only the
person’s word as evidence (i.e., the laughably exonerating, “I smoked
marijuana but never inhaled”).116
Personal or intimate details shared via email, text message, Twitter, or Facebook
posting can be widely disseminated very quickly. Online content can be saved
indefinitely and searched quickly and easily. Such evidence cannot be easily erased or
disavowed. Youth understand these truths and accept them.117 Such knowledge will
likely carry into adulthood and continues to shape perceptions of privacy.
In an article about youth revelations on the internet, Emily Nussbaum interviewed
Xiyin Tang, a nineteen-year old Columbia University student who began a blog at age
thirteen.118 The online journal was distributed to 200 readers, yet Tang viewed her
writing as personal: “I basically wrote as if there was no one reading it. And if people
wanted to read it, then great.”119 But as readership grew, so did Tang’s awareness of
her audience, and she started to write with them in mind. Her style and content were

113. See Michelle N. Kwasny et al., Privacy and Technology: Folk Definitions and Perspectives, 26 CHI.
CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3291, 3295 (2008) (concluding that older adults tend to
view privacy in terms of space rather than in terms of information).
114. See Abril, supra note 80, at 77 (noting that digital immigrants “grew up in a world where they had
the luxury of control over their information”).
115. See id. at 77–78.
116. Id. at 77 (footnote omitted). Older adults are also less likely to understand technology and may
underestimate the degree to which others may intercept their conversations or the number of people who have
access to the information they transmit using a cell phone or computer. See id. at 76–78 (discussing how
digital immigrants view privacy in terms of control, but do not understand technology well enough to realize
that even if they originally control disclosure of personal information online, this information can be
disseminated throughout the online world).
117. See Nussbaum, supra note 85.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Tang).

614

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

aimed to impress and grow her online community.120 This self-awareness did not
necessarily translate into caution.121
Nussbaum concludes that youth have become accustomed to thinking of every
communication as potentially public.122 They know that even a private email can be
forwarded to an infinite number of others or the content can be copied and pasted onto
a public website.123
It’s a form of communication that requires a person to be constantly aware
that anything you say can and will be used against you, but somehow not to
mind.
. . . In essence, every young person in America has become, in the literal
sense, a public figure. And so they have adopted the skills that celebrities
learn in order not to go crazy: enjoying the attention instead of fighting it—
and doing their own publicity before somebody does it for them.124
This perception of oneself is unlikely to change dramatically with age; instead,
experience is likely to confirm and strengthen it. As a consequence, the view of self
and privacy embraced by youth may become the predominant view of older adults in
the near future.
IV. VARYING EXPECTATIONS, VARYING PROTECTION
Viewing these findings in the context of the subjective portion of the Fourth
Amendment test, it is clear that whether a person has a subjective expectation of
privacy in any given circumstance may depend, at least in part, on the person’s age. An
older adult may believe that information posted on a social networking site is private
and thus have a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to that information. The
expectation may be particularly strong if privacy settings have been set to limit access;
but the expectation of privacy may also exist if the user does not understand that the
default settings allow everyone to view the user’s profile or if only some of the settings
are set to limit access. Even though the content is available to third parties, they may
view it as analogous to written letters, which are protected from government
searches.125 Consequently, they may assume that the postings are likewise protected. If
the Court finds that society is prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable,126 then
the information will be protected by the Fourth Amendment.127

120. Id.
121. Id. As Nussbaum reports, “Xiyin knows there’s a scare factor in having such a big online
viewership—you could get stalked for real, or your employer could bust you for partying. But her actual
experience has been that if someone is watching, it’s probably a good thing. . . . All sorts of opportunities—
romantic, professional, creative—seem to Xiyin to be directly linked to her willingness to reveal herself a
little.” Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy in sealed, mailed letters).
126. This objective component will be discussed in Part V, infra. Whether “society” is prepared to
accept a subjective expectation as reasonable may also depend upon the age of those whose opinions are
considered. Younger citizens may be likely to conclude that it is unreasonable to believe that information
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Conversely, a younger adult may have no subjective expectation of privacy with
respect to anything posted on a social network site. Since younger users tend to use
sites to keep in contact with friends and make new friends, they are more likely to view
the sites as a means of displaying information instead of hiding it.128 Under these facts,
courts would not need to consider the objective portion of the Fourth Amendment test;
if there is no subjective expectation of privacy, there is no Fourth Amendment
protection.129
The point can be further illustrated by drawing upon the facts of City of Ontario v.
Quon.130 In Quon, the district court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals debated
whether a search of text messages Officer Quon sent using his government-issued
pager was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.131 There was disagreement on this
point,132 but the courts were in agreement that Quon had a subjective expectation of
privacy in the messages133 despite a department policy that specifically stated that
“[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these
resources.”134 Moreover, Quon’s expectation was held to be reasonable.135
A younger employee in the same circumstances may be more likely to take the
department’s stated policy at face value and not have a subjective expectation of
privacy, particularly since the younger employee may only recently have graduated
from school, which may have had a similar policy, or previously had a cell phone
purchased by his or her parents who had a right to see the content of any text messages.
Lacking a subjective expectation of privacy, that younger employee’s text messages

posted on a social network site is private. See infra Part V for a discussion of the objective component of
determining whether Fourth Amendment protection applies.
127. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that in addition
to a subjective inquiry, the court must execute an objective inquiry, and ask whether one’s subjective
expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” when determining whether
the Fourth Amendment will apply).
128. See Ellison et al., supra note 85, at 1143 (explaining that some Facebook users use the site to
interact with people they know and to meet new people); Nussbaum supra note 85 (describing social network
site users who disclose personal information to the public in order to have fun, show their creativity, stay
connected with friends, and meet strangers).
129. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979) (indicating that in some extraordinary
circumstances Fourth Amendment protection may apply despite a lack of a subjective expectation of privacy).
130. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
131. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626–27. See supra notes 69–78 and accompanying text for further discussion
of Quon.
132. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (explaining that the district court found no Fourth Amendment
violation whereas the appellate court found that the scope of the search was unreasonable).
133. See id. at 2626–27 (indicating that the district and appellate courts disagreed on the reasonableness
of the search itself, not the plaintiff’s subjective expectation of privacy); id. at 2629 (noting the Court assumed,
arguendo, that plaintiff had a subjective expectation of privacy).
134. Id. at 2625. One of Quon’s superiors told him that the messages would not be searched if Quon paid
for any overages. Id. at 2629. This contradicted the stated policy and, according to the courts, justified Quon’s
subjective expectation of privacy. See id. at 2626–27 (noting the district court found the expectation of privacy
was reasonable despite the policy that explicitly stated the information would not be private or confidential).
135. See id. at 2626–27 (indicating that both the district and appellate courts found plaintiff’s
expectation of privacy was “reasonable”); id. at 2629 (assuming that plaintiff’s expectation of privacy was
“reasonable”).
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would not be protected by the Fourth Amendment (he or she could be searched without
proof that the search was reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards) even though
Quon’s messages could be protected.136
V.

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AND SEARCHES

We have no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Instead, “the Court has given
weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our
societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous
protection from government invasion.”137
Whether “society” is prepared to accept a subjective expectation of privacy as
reasonable may depend upon which segments of society are being considered. Youth
and young adults may believe that any expectation of privacy when using many forms
of technology is unreasonable.138 This may reflect their greater understanding of the
technology139 and the risks involved in using almost any technology.140 They may be
familiar with successful attempts to hack into or access codes or accounts, and
understand that few if any sites or accounts are truly secure.141 Consequently, they may
consider any subjective expectation of privacy to be unreasonable.

136. The search of the messages was ultimately held to be reasonable and not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; but the reasonableness of the search would have been irrelevant if Quon’s expectation of privacy
was not reasonable in the first instance. See id. at 2628–29 (explaining that a plaintiff’s reasonable expectation
of privacy must be determined on a “case-by-case” basis, but nonetheless deciding the Fourth Amendment
issue based on the alternative grounds of the search’s reasonableness).
137. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178
(1984)).
138. See Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 1179–81 (discussing the “divergence in privacy norms
between heavily wired teens and their parents”); McGeveran, supra note 83, at 1126 (stating that younger
users have a relaxed opinion about online information privacy and believe that if people do not like sharing
personal information, they should not participate in online social networks); Salaway et al., supra note 104, at
91–93 (presenting a study that showed the younger the student, the greater likelihood that he or she would
reveal personal information over a social networking site); Sheehan, supra note 83 (finding that younger, lesseducated internet users have the lowest privacy concern, whereas younger, better-educated internet users have
a slightly more moderate level of privacy concern, as compared to older users); Youn, supra note 93, at 89–90,
104 (study suggesting that, because teenagers see certain activities as prevalent and popular and therefore not
risky, they are more interested in the benefits they will receive from disclosing personal information than they
are with the privacy risks associated with their online activity).
139. See Youn, supra note 93, at 86–89 (discussing how teenagers today grew up with the Internet and
are more knowledgeable about it, often having to coach their parents about how to use the Internet); cf. Abril,
supra note 80, at 76 (describing youth who grew up with the Internet as “digital natives”); Dommeyer &
Gross, supra note 99, at 47–48 (finding that younger people were more aware of privacy protection strategies).
140. Cf. Dommeyer & Gross, supra note 99, at 47–48 (finding that youth have greater knowledge and
awareness of privacy protections); Youn, supra note 93, at 91, 97 (study finding that teenagers are aware of
potential risks online and therefore will often provide false information).
141. Cf. Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 1179–81 (suggesting that teenagers may be aware of risks, but
are “notorious risk-takers” and therefore may not recognize the later consequences of disclosing personal
information online).
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Youth, “Special Needs,” and Lower Expectations

The reasonable expectation of privacy of students has received a great deal of
attention from courts. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has found “generally,
students have a less robust expectation of privacy than is afforded the general
population.”142 This is not to say that students have no privacy protection, but such
expectations are diminished because of age and the particular needs of the school
setting.143 Even where a subjective, reasonable expectation of privacy is found, the
courts have often held that searches of students are reasonable and, therefore, not in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.144
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,145 the Court considered a student’s claim that a school
administrator’s search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights.146 The
search occurred after a teacher claimed to have caught T.L.O. and another student
smoking in the girls’ restroom.147 Smoking violated school policy, and the girls were
taken to the assistant vice principal.148 Although her companion admitted to smoking,
T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking in the restroom and further claimed that she
did not smoke at all.149 The assistant vice principal took T.L.O. into his office and
examined the contents of her purse.150 The search revealed a pack of cigarettes as well
as evidence that T.L.O. had been smoking and perhaps selling marijuana.151 In addition
to receiving a suspension from school, T.L.O. faced juvenile delinquency charges.152
T.L.O. sought to have the evidence obtained from her purse suppressed on the ground
that the search violated her Fourth Amendment rights.153
The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment protects students from
unreasonable searches and seizures.154 Moreover, the Court recognized that although
the need to maintain security in schools is a legitimate and often difficult task,
students—unlike prisoners—do not abandon all expectations of privacy when they go
to school. “[T]here [wa]s no reason to conclude that [school children] have necessarily

142. Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 496 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)).
143. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
144. See, e.g., id. at 341–42 (holding that a teacher’s search of a student is reasonable, and thus
compliant with the Fourth Amendment, if it is “justified at its inception” and reasonable in scope (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1967))).
145. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
146. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329, 331.
147. Id. at 328.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 329 & n.1.
153. Id. at 329.
154. Id. at 336–37. This holding resolved a split in the lower courts, some of which had held that school
officials acted in loco parentis and, as such, were exempt from the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. (citing R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983)).

618

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

waived all rights to privacy in [legitimate, non-contraband items] merely by bringing
them onto school grounds.”155
However, the Court held that the need for school officials to maintain discipline
and a safe environment called for relaxation of the warrant and probable cause
requirements that prevail in other Fourth Amendment contexts.156 With respect to the
warrant requirement, the Court held that “requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before
searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law)
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed in the schools.”157 Likewise, the Court held that something less than
probable cause was necessary to justify searches of schoolchildren by teachers and
administrators.158 Instead, the proper test was “reasonableness, under all of the
circumstances.”159 Establishing reasonableness requires proof that: (1) the search was
reasonable at its inception; and (2) that the scope of the search was reasonable in light
of the circumstances.160
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher . . . will be
“justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to
the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.161
The Court held that the search of T.L.O.’s purse was reasonable at its inception and in
scope and, consequently, did not violate her rights under the Fourth Amendment.162
In United States v. Heckenkamp,163 a student whose personal computer was
searched based upon suspicion that the student had used the computer to gain
unauthorized access to the university computer system alleged that the warrantless
search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.164 The Ninth Circuit held that the
student’s subjective expectation of privacy in his computer was objectively
reasonable,165 even after he logged onto the university network, finding that the mere
act of accessing a network does not extinguish privacy expectations.166 Unlike the

155. Id. at 338–39.
156. Id. at 339–41. The Court noted, “It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.” Id. at 340.
157. Id. at 340.
158. Id. at 341.
159. Id.
160. Id. Note that this is the same test applied to searches of government employees’ work spaces. See
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987).
161. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42 (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. at 346–47.
163. 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007).
164. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1143–46.
165. Id. at 1147.
166. Id. at 1146–47.
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policy in Biby,167 the University of Wisconsin policy at issue in Heckenkamp reinforced
students’ expectations of privacy. It stated that
[i]n general, all computer and electronic files should be free from access by
any but the authorized users of those files. Exceptions to this basic principle
shall be kept to a minimum and made only where essential to . . . protect the
integrity of the University and the rights and property of the state.168
Notwithstanding the reasonable expectation of privacy, the Ninth Circuit held that
the search was reasonable under the “special needs” exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.169 The search was conducted by a university
administrator solely in his capacity as a system administrator for the purpose of
protecting the integrity of the university network and not for any law enforcement
purpose.170 The university’s actions were consistent with its policy, to which
Heckenkamp had assented, because it was conducting the search in response to an
“emergency situation[] that threaten[ed] the integrity of campus computer or
communication systems.”171 The court further noted that the relationship between the
student and the campus systems administrator was different from the “adversarial
relationship” between criminal suspects and law enforcement.172 No warrant was
required under the circumstances and the search was held to have been reasonable.173
In Brannum v. Overton County School Board,174 the issue was privacy in middle
school locker rooms.175 A middle school installed video surveillance cameras in the
boys’ and girls’ locker rooms (and other locations throughout the building) as part of
an effort to increase security at the school.176 The cameras viewed and recorded
students while changing clothes, so that some of the video included students while in
their undergarments.177 Neither students nor their parents ever consented to the
surveillance; indeed, they were not informed that the videotaping was taking place.178
Applying the standards set out in T.L.O., the Sixth Circuit first concluded that the
students had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker rooms.179 The court

167. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Biby case.
168. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1147 (alteration and omission in original).
169. Id.
170. Id. In fact, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was in the process of getting a search warrant and
had asked the administrator to delay conducting his own search. The administrator, motivated by his concerns
about the security of the university email server, conducted the search anyway. Thus, not only was the
administrator not acting in concert with law enforcement officials, his actions were contrary to the law
enforcement officials’ desires. Id.
171. Id. at 1147–48.
172. Id. at 1148.
173. Id.
174. 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008).
175. Brannum, 516 F.3d at 491–92.
176. Id. at 492.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 496.
179. Brannum, 516 F.3d at 496 (“[W]e are satisfied that students using the LMS locker rooms could
reasonably expect that no one, especially the school administrators, would videotape them, without their
knowledge, in various states of undress while they changed their clothes for an athletic activity.”).
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further found that the videotaping of the students without their knowledge or
permission was unreasonable in scope and violated those expectations of privacy:180
[W]e believe placing cameras in such a way so as to view the children
dressing and undressing in a locker room is incongruent to any demonstrated
necessity, and wholly disproportionate to the claimed policy goal of assuring
increased school security, especially when there is no history of any threat to
security in the locker rooms.181
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of student strip searches in Safford
Unified School District #1 v. Redding.182 In that case, another student told school
officials that thirteen-year-old Savana Redding had given her prescription-strength
ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxen.183 Such medications were prohibited on
school grounds without permission.184 Based upon this information and other pills
found in a day planner that belonged to Redding, school officials called Redding into
the assistant principal’s office and questioned her.185 After denying having any
knowledge of the pills, Redding consented to a search of her belongings.186 A search of
her backpack revealed nothing.187
Redding was then taken to the school nurse’s office and was instructed to remove
her outer clothing and pull her undergarments away from her body so that school
officials could search her for pills.188 No pills were found.189 Redding’s mother filed
suit alleging violation of Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights.190 The federal district
court and a panel of the Ninth Circuit both held in favor of the school board, finding no
Fourth Amendment violation.191 After rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit
held that the search was unreasonable and reversed.192
The Supreme Court agreed that the search was unreasonable and affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s holding on the Fourth Amendment issue.193 The Court first addressed
Redding’s expectations of privacy. Redding’s “subjective expectation of privacy
against such a search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and
humiliating. The reasonableness of her expectation . . . is indicated by the consistent
experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability

180. Id. at 497–98.
181. Id. at 498.
182. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
183. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. The school nurse and a female administrative assistant conducted the search and were the only
other persons present. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2642–43. The court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the rights at issue were clearly
established, thus depriving the officials of qualified immunity. Id. at 2643–44.
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intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure.”194 The Court then turned to the
factors set out in T.L.O. to determine whether the search was reasonable at its inception
and in scope.195
While the search of her backpack and outer clothing was reasonable,196 the Court
found the search of her underwear excessive in light of the facts.197 First, Redding was
suspected of concealing pills that were available over the counter, as opposed to illegal
or inherently harmful drugs.198 The Court further found it implausible that Redding
would be hiding pills in her underwear.199 “[T]he categorically extreme intrusiveness of
a search down to the body of an adolescent requires some justification in suspected
facts, general background possibilities fall short; a reasonable search that extensive
calls for suspicion that it will pay off.”200 Because the scope of the search was
unreasonable, it violated Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights.201
B.

Which Segment of Society Determines what is Reasonable?

Realities of the school environment lead to lesser protection for youth, which may
explain decreased subjective expectations of privacy among that age group. This
decreased subjective expectation may also affect how a court might answer the second
part of the Fourth Amendment test. The objective part of the Fourth Amendment test
asks whether “society” is prepared to accept a given subjective expectation of privacy
as reasonable.202 Since “society” is presumably composed of people from all segments
of the population, the answer may vary depending upon which group’s beliefs prevail.
As the examples above and in Part IV demonstrate, varying privacy expectations
could lead courts to provide greater protection to older adults than younger adults even
though the information and surrounding circumstances at issue (postings on a social
network site, text messages sent on government-issued pagers) are exactly the same. To
the extent that varying expectations are inevitable, the courts must also decide whether
the expectations of one group should prevail over those of another. Erring on the side
of protection, it seems logical that courts should prefer the viewpoint of older
generations, particularly since their expectations have been shaped by prior precedent
and their own experiences.
Adopting views typical of older citizens might result in greater protection for all
citizens since they might be willing to accept as reasonable subjective expectations that
younger citizens believe to be unreasonable. This can occur because cases brought
before a court are decided based upon whether the particular judges or jury hearing the

194. Id. at 2641.
195. Id. at 2641–43.
196. Id. at 2641 (“If Wilson’s reasonable suspicion of pill distribution were [sic] not understood to
support searches of outer clothes and backpack, it would not justify any search worth making.”).
197. Id. at 2642–43.
198. Id. at 2642. Although the ibuprofen pills Savana was suspected of bringing onto school property
were prescription strength, the pills were equivalent to two over-the-counter strength pills. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2642–43.
202. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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case believe that “society” is willing to accept a person’s subjective expectation as
reasonable. If those judges adopt the more conservative view of privacy favored by
older generations, the result will be a finding that “society” is willing to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to the circumstances of that case. The result will be binding on
the government even with respect to those who do not share that belief. Consequently,
younger people may be protected even though they would not have found the
expectation of privacy to be reasonable.
This is not to say that the views of youth can or should be ignored. As they age,
their privacy expectations may become the norm and reflect the views of an increasing
share of the population. As discussed above, subjective privacy expectations among
youth are diminishing even outside of regulated spaces such as schools. If these
attitudes persist into adulthood, the expectations of society as a whole may shift and
diminish over time. Consequently, “society” may be less willing to accept that certain
subjective expectations are reasonable. As youth continue to influence society, courts
must be aware of the changes and make decisions regarding the reasonableness of
privacy expectations accordingly. Even if judges—particularly older judges—maintain
heightened expectations of privacy, if the government can establish that large segments
of society do not support those expectations, the judges will have to choose between
their own beliefs and those of other, potentially larger, segments of society.
VI. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Legislation may be the easiest way for privacy rights to be protected in the
absence of a subjective expectation of privacy; but the law tends to lag considerably
behind technology.203 Congress has enacted many statutes that affect electronic
communication and internet use. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
governs the interception of wire and electronic communications.204 The ECPA
amended the Federal Wiretap Act to extend protections that previously applied to the
interception of oral and telephone communications to electronic and data
transmissions.205 The ECPA prohibits the interception or disclosure of such
communications unless: the party intercepting is a party to the communication; the
intercepting party has the consent of a party to the communication; or the intercepting
party is authorized by law to intercept or conduct electronic surveillance.206 Even those
authorized parties cannot disclose the information without a court order, statutory
authorization, or certification.207 If a communication is available to the general public,
then it is not unlawful to intercept or access it.208

203. See Tracy Mitrano, A Wider World: Youth, Privacy, and Social Networking Technologies,
EDUCAUSE REV., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 16, 20.
204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
205. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The paramount objective of
the Wiretap Act is to protect effectively the privacy of communications.”).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b)–(d). Examples of authorized persons are landlords or internet service
providers. Id. § 2511(a)(ii).
207. Id. § 2511(a)(ii)(A)–(B).
208. Id. § 2511(g)(1). Communications of a “computer trespasser” (one who uses a protected computer
without authorization) can also be intercepted if the owner of the protected computer gives consent or if there
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Federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, can obtain
permission to intercept certain communications if they can establish that the
communication may provide evidence of a crime relating to federal offenses such as
counterfeiting, fraud, extortion, obscenity, location of a fugitive, smuggling of aliens,
firearms, production of false identification documents, or terrorism.209 If a
governmental agency is granted permission to intercept the communications or if they
have obtained any knowledge of the contents of the communications, then they can
disclose this information and evidence to other law enforcement officers.210 Privileged
communications remain privileged even if intercepted.211 While intercepting
communications, if the agency discovers communications related to another crime, they
can intercept those communications if they obtain a court order using the guidelines of
the statute.212
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) is Title II of the ECPA and protects
information that is being stored or temporarily stored.213 The SCA makes it unlawful to
intentionally access, without authorization or by exceeding authorization, a facility
where electronic communication service is provided.214 An electronic communications
service provider can disclose only a customer’s electronically stored information under
the following circumstances: to the recipient of the communication; by consent of the
originator of the communication; as authorized by law under 18 U.S.C. § 2511; for
purposes of providing the service; to a law enforcement officer if the communications
appear criminal; to the National Center for Missing or Exploited Children; or to a
government agency if the service provider has a good faith belief that there is imminent
danger to a person.215 The provider can also disclose the customer’s record for many of
the same reasons.216
If the communication has been stored for less than 180 days, then the government
entity must obtain a warrant in order to obtain the information.217 If it has been stored
for more than 180 days, the entity can obtain the communications by warrant,
subpoena, or court order.218 If the investigation regards telemarketing fraud then the
entity can obtain the customer records by warrant, court order, consent by the customer,
is an investigation. Id. §§ 2510(21), 2511(2)(i). Foreign communication does not have the same standard
because it is governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Cf. id. § 2511(e) (“Notwithstanding any
other provision of this title . . . it shall not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or agent of the United States in
the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as authorized by that Act.”).
209. Id. § 2516.
210. Id. § 2517.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711.
214. Id. § 2701(a). To violate the statute, the individual accessing the electronic communication service
without authorization must “obtain[], alter[], or prevent[] authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in” the service’s system. Id. § 2701(a)(2)
215. Id. § 2702(b).
216. Id.
217. Id. § 2703(a).
218. Id. § 2703(a)–(b). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the SCA is unconstitutional to the extent that it allows disclosure of email content without a warrant).
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or a written request.219 The subpoena or court order may also include an order to have
the service provider make a backup copy of the communications.220 In that case, the
provider has to make a copy without notifying the customer.221 Afterwards, the
government will give notice to the customer, thus giving the customer the opportunity
to file a motion to quash.222
The First Circuit had occasion to apply the ECPA in a class action brought against
several pharmaceutical companies and Pharmatrak, a company that developed a service
called “NETcompare” that provided the pharmaceutical companies with intra-industry
website traffic and usage comparisons.223 “NETcompare was marketed as a tool that
would allow a company to compare traffic on and usage of different parts of its website
with the same information from its competitors’ websites. . . . This informationgathering was not visible to users of the pharmaceutical clients’ websites.”224 When the
companies signed up for the services, they conditioned their participation upon
Pharmatrak’s assurance that no personal information about the website users would be
collected.225 Despite those assurances, some personal information was collected.226 The
lawsuit was filed by and on behalf of users whose information had been collected by
Pharmatrak, alleging that the data collection violated the ECPA.227 The district court
granted Pharmatrak’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the
pharmaceutical companies consented to Pharmatrak’s activities by contracting for
Pharmatrak’s services.228 This consent brought Pharmatrak within the “consent”
exception to the ECPA.229
On appeal, the First Circuit set out the elements of an ECPA claim: the defendant
must have intentionally intercepted, endeavored to intercept, or procured another to
intercept the contents of an electronic communication using a device.230 The defendant
can defeat an ECPA claim if its conduct falls within a statutory exception, including the
consent of one of the parties to the communication.231 The First Circuit then disagreed
with the district court on the issue of the pharmaceutical companies’ consent.232 First, it
held that the party claiming the benefit of the consent exception has the burden of

219. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
220. Id. § 2704.
221. Id. § 2704(a). The lack of notice is intended to prevent deletion of the communication before it can
be intercepted. Id. § 2705(a)(1), (2)(C).
222. Id. § 2704.
223. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
224. Id. at 15.
225. Id. at 12.
226. Id. at 15. The information included names, addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses,
birthdates, gender, insurance status, level of education, occupation, medical conditions, and reasons for visiting
the websites. Id. Of the estimated 18.7 million users, the plaintiff’s expert was able to develop 232 user
profiles using this information. Id.
227. Id. at 12.
228. Id. at 13.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 18.
231. Id. at 19.
232. Id. at 20.
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proving consent.233 Next, the court clarified what constitutes consent under the
ECPA.234
“Consent may be explicit or implied, but it must be actual consent rather than
constructive consent.”235 Consent cannot be implied merely by purchase of a service.236
Instead, implied consent requires circumstances that “convincingly” demonstrate
knowledge of and consent to the interception.237 Applying this standard, the court held
that the pharmaceutical companies did not consent to the interceptions that allegedly
violated the ECPA.238 “Far from consenting to the collection of personally identifiable
information, the pharmaceutical clients explicitly conditioned their purchase of
NETcompare on the fact that it would not collect such information.”239 Furthermore,
the court held that the undisputed facts showed that the website users did not even
know about the Pharmatrak program and, therefore, could not have consented to
Pharmatrak’s collection of personal information.240
Finally, the court addressed the requirement that data or electronic
communications be “intercepted” by the defendant.241 Interception is “the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”242 Prior to the ECPA’s enactment, a
debate emerged among courts with respect to how narrowly this definition should be
construed.243 Some courts argued that interception occurred only if the acquisition was
contemporaneous with the transmission.244 If the transmission was stored for a period
of time before the acquisition, then no “interception” was held to have occurred.245
The debate continued after the ECPA was enacted, with some circuits
distinguishing between acquisitions while the transmission was in transit and
acquisitions from storage.246 The First Circuit found it unnecessary to choose sides in
the debate, since the alleged acquisitions by Pharmatrak were contemporaneous with
the transmissions,247 but the court noted that it was concerned about the interpretation
of terms in the statute in the era of rapid development and use of technology:248
We share the concern of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits about the judicial
interpretation of a statute written prior to the widespread usage of the
internet and the World Wide Web in a case involving purported interceptions

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. (quoting Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
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of online communications. In particular, the storage-transit dichotomy
adopted by earlier courts may be less than apt to address current problems.
As one court recently observed, “[T]echnology has, to some extent,
overtaken language. Traveling the internet, electronic communications are
often—perhaps constantly—both ‘in transit’ and ‘in storage’ simultaneously,
a linguistic but not a technological paradox.”249
The court ultimately reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded to the
district court to determine whether Pharmatrak had the requisite intent to intercept
necessary for liability under the ECPA.250
The Councilman case quoted in Pharmatrak involved interpretation of the
Wiretap Act as it existed before amendment by the ECPA.251 The Pharmatrak opinion
quoted the district court opinion in Councilman.252 After deciding Pharmatrak, the
district court holding in Councilman was appealed to the First Circuit.253 The issue
before the court was the alleged storage-transit dichotomy in the Wiretap Act.254
Councilman ran an online book listing service called Interloc, Inc.255 Interloc’s
services included providing email services for its users.256 Interloc gave users an email
address at the interloc.com domain and acted as an email service provider.257
Councilman was indicted for allegedly intercepting, copying, and reading incoming
emails from Amazon.com before delivering those email messages to the intended
recipient.258 The messages were allegedly intercepted to give Councilman a
competitive advantage.259
Councilman moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a claim under the
Wiretap Act.260 The Wiretap Act only prohibited interception of electronic
communications.261 Councilman argued that the messages in question were in
electronic storage when intercepted; he further argued that communications in
electronic storage were not “electronic communications” and, therefore, the
interceptions did not violate the Wiretap Act.262 The district court agreed with
Councilman and granted the motion to dismiss.263 On appeal to the First Circuit, the

249. Id. at 21–22 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Councilman, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003)).
250. Id. at 22–23 (noting that the ECPA does not impose liability for inadvertent interceptions).
251. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 320–21.
252. Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21–22.
253. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
254. See id. at 72.
255. Id. at 70.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 70–71.
260. Id. at 71.
261. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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full court granted rehearing en banc after a divided panel affirmed the district court’s
ruling.264
The court began with the text of the statute.265 Councilman argued that the plain
text of the Wiretap Act exempted electronic communications that were in storage.266
His argument relied on a comparison of the definition of “wire communication” before
and after it was amended by the ECPA and the definition of “electronic
communication.”267 The ECPA amended the term “wire communication” to include
“any electronic storage of such communication.”268 On the other hand, the term
“electronic communication” does not mention storage.269 Comparing these terms,
Councilman concluded that the “plain text” of the statute excludes electronic storage
from the Wiretap Act.270
The court disagreed that the plain text supported Councilman’s conclusion. It held
that Councilman’s conclusion with respect to Congress’s intent was not clear from a
plain reading of the statute; instead, it required an “inferential leap.”271 Unable to
resolve the issue after reading the plain text and applying canons of statutory
construction, the court turned to the legislative history for guidance.272 The court found
that the legislative history indicated that Congress intended to include “transient
electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication process for such
communications” in the definition of “electronic communication.”273 Thus, the court
rejected the distinction between “in transit” and “in storage” communications proposed
by Councilman.274
The court then discussed the intersection of the ECPA and the SCA. The
government’s claim was brought under the former and Councilman argued that it
should have been brought under the latter.275 If the plaintiffs had brought their claim
under the SCA, Councilman’s actions could have fallen under an exception that allows
service providers to view the electronic communications in some instances, such as for
transferring the messages to their destination or to provide the services necessary for
their users.276 Councilman argued that if he did not violate the SCA, then he could not
have violated the Wiretap Act.277

264. Id.
265. Id. at 72–76.
266. Id. at 73.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1); ECPA § 101(a)(1)(D)).
269. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 76–79.
273. Id. at 79.
274. Id. “Indeed, we doubt that Congress contemplated the existential oddity that Councilman’s
interpretation creates: messages—conceded by stipulation to be electronic communications—briefly cease to
be electronic communications for very short intervals, and then suddenly become electronic communications
again.” Id. at 78.
275. Id. at 80.
276. Id. at 81–82.
277. Id. at 82.
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The First Circuit noted that previous courts had found that the overlap of statutes
does not hinder a claim—the prosecution can choose which to bring a claim under.278
Moreover, the service provider exception under the Wiretap Act is much narrower than
the SCA in that it only allows for necessary interception to provide service.279 The
court held that Councilman did not fall under the Wiretap Act exception because his
interception was not necessary to provide any services promised to his users.280 This
case is instructive, therefore, not only for its statutory interpretation discussion, but also
because it highlights the limitations of statutes as a means of protecting online privacy.
If the ambiguity in the statute had been resolved in Councilman’s favor (as it was by
the district court and a panel of the First Circuit), Councilman’s actions—copying and
reading emails intended for others—would have been legal.
States have also adopted legislation aimed at protecting privacy in general, and
protecting young people from technology related threats in particular. For example,
California has adopted, and is in the process of adopting, several statutes aimed at
internet use and privacy. Effective since 2005, a statute known as the “Shine the Light”
law281 requires that certain businesses (including online businesses) must, upon request,
reveal to a customer the third parties with which the business has shared his or her
personal identifying information within the past year.282 This could assist customers in
determining if a business that they frequent was providing their names and personal
information to a third party which had sent spam or junk mail to the customer.
Another California statute requires online services that collect personal data from
visitors to post their privacy policy on their website.283 New York has a similar statute,
the Internet Security and Privacy Act, that requires state agencies to post privacy
policies on their websites and provides elements to be included therein.284 These
elements include the following: what information will be used and how it will be used,
circumstances under which collected information may be disclosed, how long the
information will be retained, the procedures by which the user can obtain their
information from the agency, the means by which the information is collected, the
consequences for not providing the information, and the steps taken to protect the
confidentiality of the information.285 Although both of these laws inform users about
how their personal information is being shared and used, nothing prevents businesses
or online services from sharing the information. Consequently, instead of strengthening
privacy protection, the knowledge that personal information is being shared may
decrease subjective expectations of privacy, thereby decreasing Fourth Amendment
protection.

278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally California’s “Shine the Light” Law Goes into Effect Jan. 1, 2005, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 29, 2004), www.privacyrights.org/ar/SB27Release.htm.
282. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.83–1798.84 (West 2011).
283. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22578 (West 2011).
284. N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW §§ 201–208 (McKinney 2011).
285. Id. § 203.
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Utah’s Government Internet Information Privacy Act286 prevents the state
government from collecting personally identifiable information on a government
entity’s website, unless the website contains a privacy policy statement that identifies
the government operator, provides telephone and electronic contact information,
identifies the information collected and how it is used, the procedures for a user to
request access to the information collected, and the security measures taken to prevent
unintended disclosure of personal information.287 Presumably, if the privacy policy is
posted and contains the required information, the government can collect personally
identifiable information. This is particularly important in the Fourth Amendment
context, since the information that is voluntarily given to the government eliminates the
need for a warrant.288
Connecticut has enacted legislation aimed at workplace privacy.289 An employer
who engages in electronic monitoring of its employees must give them prior written
notice about the types of monitoring that may occur.290 The written notice can be
posted in a place that is readily viewed by employees.291 However, an employer can
monitor without written notice if it believes that the employee is engaging in illegal
activities.292
Delaware has a similar law.293 It requires employers to give employees notice if
they intend to monitor or intercept telephone conversations, electronic mail
transmissions, or Internet access and usage. However, in Delaware, employers must
give notice at least once each day that the employee accesses the employer-provided
email or Internet access services.294 In light of these laws, it may be difficult for
employees whose employers have given the required notice to claim any expectation of
privacy in their workplace computers, phones, or other technological devices.
VII. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TEST
A.

Defining the Problem

Rapid advances in technology have led to litigation, legislation, and significant
scholarship.295 Despite all of this attention, there is still a great deal of uncertainty with

286. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63D-2-101–104 (West 2011).
287. Id. § 63D-2-103.
288. Other states also require government websites to post their privacy policies, including: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New York, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Privacy Policies: Government Websites, NAT’L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx#g
ovpolicies (last visited May 26, 2012).
289. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (West 2011).
290. Id. § 31-48d(b)(1).
291. Id.
292. Id. § 31-48d(b)(2).
293. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (West 2011).
294. Id. § 705(b)(1).
295. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 80, at 78–81 (redefining tort law in the face of issues raised by online
social networks); Matthew J. Hodge, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the “New” Internet:
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respect to privacy and Fourth Amendment protection when technology is at issue. This
uncertainty persists, in part, because courts often seem unwilling or unable to address
how privacy rights are affected by technology. The privacy expectations in even widely
used technology such as email and various smartphone applications have not been
resolved.296
The Supreme Court itself appears reluctant to address privacy expectations
involving new technologies, in part because of its own lack of understanding and
discomfort with such technology. As technology becomes an even more prevalent
presence in our everyday lives (especially the lives of youth and young adults), we will
be faced with greater uncertainty about our privacy rights. Living with such uncertainty
forces us to choose between outdated and cumbersome modes of interaction that have
been declared private and protected by the courts, and the faster, more convenient
modes of interaction that may not be protected under the Fourth Amendment.
For example, attempts to completely control access to a website may be difficult
or impossible, particularly websites sponsored by another website.297 Shutterfly is a
photo processing website that allows users to upload photographs.298 The photo owner
can then order prints of the photos from the site and invite others to view and order
prints of the photos.299 Shutterfly also allows users to create websites.300 The creator
can post photos and videos that have been uploaded to Shutterfly and can invite others
(i.e., other participants) to view the website.301 Only those invited by the creator can
view the site; those users must have a Shutterfly account and must sign into Shutterfly
with their username and password before accessing the website.302 Such Shutterfly
websites are not completely private (since all invited participants can view the

Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 102–05 (2006) (interpreting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979) in the internet context); Brian Kane & Brett T. Delange, A Tale of Two Internets: Web 2.0
Slices, Dices, and is Privacy Resistant, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 317 (2009) (discussing the roles of informed parents
and consumer preferences in counteracting online privacy problems); Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases,
52 AM. U. L. REV. 393 (2002) (analyzing technology in the context of privacy laws); Elbert Lin, Prioritizing
Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2002) (arguing in favor of
recognizing a right to privacy in state constitutions); Samantha L. Miller, Note, The Facebook Frontier:
Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541 (2008) (considering selfregulation, U.S., and European law in the context of online privacy); John S. Wilson, Comment, MySpace,
Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201 (2007) (considering
online privacy in the context of e-discovery in litigation).
296. Some courts have addressed this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th
Cir. 2010) (holding that email content is protected by the Fourth Amendment). But uncertainty persists, since
the responses have not been uniform and the Supreme Court has declined to weigh in.
297. See boyd & Ellison, supra note 82, at 222 (explaining the diminished control that users of social
networking sites enjoy over the privacy of the personal information on their profile pages); Earp et al., supra
note 81, at 234 (showing that privacy policies of websites often do not accord with users’ privacy preferences).
298. SHUTTERFLY, http://www.shutterfly.com (last visited May 26, 2012).
299. My Pictures, SHUTTERFLY, http://www.shutterfly.com/nav/signedOutMyPics.sfly (last visited May
26, 2012).
300. Share Sites, SHUTTERFLY, http://www.shutterfly.com/sites/create/welcome.sfly?fid=1dbff8d2a7aed
2cb (last visited May 26, 2012).
301. Id.
302. Id.

2012]

CHANGING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

631

contents) but viewing is limited to invited participants.303 The site is, therefore,
different from a social networking site that presumes public access and requires steps to
keep content private. But similar to social networking sites, the site sponsor—
Shutterfly—has access to the contents of the website.304 Moreover, Shutterfly’s privacy
policy notes that personal information may be shared with third parties.305
Shutterfly website creators and participants may use the site as a means of
communication and as a way to share photos with friends and loved ones.306 The
function is similar to conversations that at one time took place through phone calls and
the postal service. Instead of having a dozen copies of a photo made and mailing those
copies to friends and relatives around the country, they can be posted on the website
and viewed by those same persons. Thus, technology has introduced new ways of
maintaining relationships and sharing intimate details of our lives. Whether the site
creator or other participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth
Amendment purposes is unclear under current case law. Thus, for one concerned with
privacy, the choice becomes: avoid the technology or websites or accept the risk that
any expectation of privacy may not be recognized by law.
Similarly, email and social network users may know that the internet provider and
some other entities have access to the account; but if the only way to maintain complete
privacy is to avoid internet communication altogether, they may decide to accept
compromised privacy for the sake of fast, efficient communication.307 Avoidance may
result in an inability to fully participate in an increasingly technologically oriented
society. Opportunities to communicate with family, friends, and even employers may
be severely limited. Many will conclude that the benefits outweigh the risks and choose
to accept the limited privacy.308
To the extent that legislatures enact laws that define privacy rights, the subjective
expectation of privacy may be easier to establish. However, if individuals, particularly
younger individuals, consciously choose to make information public, or at least fail to

303. As an alternative, Shutterfly users can create a website that is open to the public, or a site that can
only be accessed by those with the password. Id.
304. Privacy Policy, SHUTTERFLY, http://www.shutterfly.com/help/privacy.jsp (last visited May 26,
2012).
305. Id.
306. SHUTTERFLY, supra note 300.
307. The Stored Communications Act and other legislation may provide some protection for such
hesitant users, but protection is not absolute. There are exceptions that allow for certain government searches,
and it is still unclear whether or under what circumstances those exceptions might violate the Fourth
Amendment. Compare United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that email
content is protected despite the fact that the service provider has access to the email), with City of Ontario v.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010) (insinuating a reluctance to extend to modern technology the quality of
protection afforded letters and telephone conversations).
308. Cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, Social Norms, Self Control, and Privacy in the Online World, in
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 31, 36 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006)
(study finding that many individuals “eventually revealed nearly as much personal information as those
ostensibly less concerned with privacy,” but “appeared to be much more conflicted about providing the
personal information that was requested, providing it only after a period of delay”); Youn, supra note 93, at
104 (study suggesting that during a teenager’s “risk and benefit appraisal[s],” “benefit perception was more
important than risk perception in predicting [their] willingness to disclose information”).
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make efforts to keep it private, the subjective expectation of privacy may be absent
notwithstanding such laws.
Moreover, as discussed above, younger generations have a better understanding of
technology and the privacy limits when using that technology. Thus, they may have
diminished privacy expectations simply because they are more knowledgeable. As they
age and such knowledge becomes the norm, subjective expectations may diminish
within society as a whole. It would be unfortunate if the price for greater understanding
of technology was diminished Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court in Smith v. Maryland noted in a footnote that, in some circumstances,
lack of a subjective expectation of privacy would not necessarily defeat Fourth
Amendment protection.309 The Court noted that if the federal government made a
nationally televised announcement that all American homes would be subject to
warrantless searches, citizens thereafter could not have a subjective expectation of
privacy.310 However, such a search would still violate the Fourth Amendment.
In such circumstances, where an individual’s subjective expectations had
been “conditioned” by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play
no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection was. In determining whether a “legitimate expectation of privacy”
existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.311
Obviously, the Court’s example is extreme, but it recognizes that the subjective
component of the Fourth Amendment test cannot be applied in a way that unduly
diminishes Fourth Amendment protection.
In the absence of adequate legislative answers, the test for Fourth Amendment
protection should change to reflect changing technology and social norms. Courts
should acknowledge that technological advances have made it more difficult to
maintain control over personal information and even physical spaces and adapt the
subjective expectation requirement to reflect this reality.
In addition, the objective component of the Fourth Amendment test needs to be
reexamined. Notwithstanding the diminished subjective expectation of privacy, society
may still want to protect certain information or physical spaces from government
intrusion, believing that the government should not be able to access their accounts and
social network pages without a warrant or some recognized exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.312 Moreover, American society is composed of many

309. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
310. Id. The Court also gave the example of an immigrant from a country in which warrantless
surveillance by the government was the norm. That person’s experiences in his home country may leave him
with no subjective expectation of privacy in circumstances in which most Americans would have such an
expectation. Id.
311. Id.
312. Tamara Dinev et al., Internet Privacy Concerns and Beliefs About Government Surveillance – An
Empirical Investigation, 17 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 214, 227–28 (2008); Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not like
1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 533–35 (2007); cf. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 13–16, 169–80 (2007) (describing the
intrusiveness of current surveillance techniques). This may be consistent with some existing legislation that
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different groups with widely varying views on privacy. Determining what “society”
will accept as reasonable necessarily requires valuing or affirming one group’s views
over another’s. This makes applying the current Fourth Amendment test difficult at
best and inconsistent at worst.
B.

A Proposed Solution

This Article proposes a modestly revised test for Fourth Amendment protection
that reflects changes in society and our evolving notions of privacy. Specifically, the
test asks: (1) whether a person has taken steps to reasonably limit access to the
information or place targeted for search or seizure; and (2) if so, whether society is
prepared to protect the information or space from unreasonable government intrusion.
Instead of asking whether a person believes that the place or information sought is
completely private or “secret,”313 the first inquiry seeks to determine whether access to
the place or information has been reasonably limited. In other words, it acknowledges
that some people may have been given or obtained access without destroying Fourth
Amendment protection, particularly those who facilitate the communication. In the case
of internet communications, a user may know that a website or social network
communication may be viewed by several parties, including the service provider and
others involved in the transmission process, yet the court could find that the user is
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
Although the user cannot reasonably prevent everyone from obtaining access to
the account or site, the user can take steps to protect the communications from most
other persons. If the user password-protects the website and does not give the password
out to anyone else, or attempts to limit access using the privacy settings available on
the social network site, the first part of the new test may be satisfied. If, on the other
hand, the user does not use a password, widely distributes the password, or logs on to
the social network account from a public computer and leaves messages on the screen
where they can be viewed and read by a large group of people, that user may be found
to have failed to reasonably limit access and, consequently, forfeit Fourth Amendment
protection. Similarly, a social network user who accepts the default “public” settings
and makes no attempt to limit access to his or her page or communications may not
claim Fourth Amendment protection.314
This new inquiry is similar to the current test and will not lead to new results in
many cases. For instance, courts have consistently found letters delivered through the
mail and the content of phone calls protected by the Fourth Amendment even though
intermediaries—mail carriers and the telephone company—could open and read a letter

could be read to protect a subjective expectation of privacy when it comes to government searches and
seizures, but the test would allow the court to find Fourth Amendment protection even if the existing
legislation does not cover a particular circumstance. Thus, the protection would exist for new technologies or
applications and would eliminate the delay between innovation and legislation.
313. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (“Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is
too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that
the numbers they dial will remain secret.”).
314. Cf. id. at 743–44.
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or listen in on a phone call.315 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has held that email content is
protected notwithstanding the internet service provider’s ability to read the content.316
Thus, the new test simply makes explicit what courts have already recognized in many
instances.
The new inquiry does have the potential to expand protection beyond what is
currently available, depending upon what courts deem to be “reasonably limited
access.” The test could be read broadly to allow individuals to disclose information to
large segments of the public while denying access to the government. This is not the
intent, nor is it likely that courts would so interpret it. Instead, although the facts of
each case will determine what is reasonable, the wider and less discriminating the
distribution, the less likely it is to be protected. The nature of the communication will
also be relevant. A website disclosing personal information that is shared with dozens
of family members may be protected, while a website that allows anyone to have
access upon request may not be protected even if only a few people have actually
visited the site.
The value in reframing the first part of the Fourth Amendment test is its ability to
address and adapt to new circumstances, including new technologies. The current
subjective portion of the test is better suited to a conceptualization of privacy based on
protection of physical spaces and information reduced to a tangible form. It is less
effective with respect to information transmitted or shared using electronic media or in
light of changing notions of “privacy.” Moreover, it punishes those who recognize that
little, if anything, is truly private when communicated or stored using the most
prevalent forms of technology. Because these more knowledgeable (and often younger)
persons do not have a subjective expectation of privacy, the current test precludes
Fourth Amendment protection. Those ignorant of the privacy risks are more likely to be
protected.
The second part of the proposed test modifies the old test by focusing on society’s
willingness to protect the place or information from government intrusion rather than
asking whether society believes that some information or some place is properly
considered “private” for all purposes. Courts will still need to evaluate “society’s”
willingness to grant the government access to certain places or information, but this
does not pose a new challenge. Instead, it simply narrows the focus of the current
objective inquiry. Under the current test, courts focus on the privacy expectation of the
search or seizure target and ask whether society accepts the subjective expectation as
reasonable. The proposed test asks whether society accepts the right to protect the
search or seizure target from government intrusion in light of the target’s attempts to
limit access to the place or information. Courts may acknowledge the reality that
keeping anything, particularly electronic communications, truly private may be
impossible, but also recognize that stripping all Fourth Amendment protection when
communications are not completely private is an unreasonable response to a new
reality.
This distinction may not entirely eliminate the age gap with respect to Fourth
Amendment protection, but it may substantially close the gap since even younger
315. E.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010).
316. Id. at 285–88.
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generations desire to protect some information from certain groups of people. Their
focus may be on providing access to friends while wanting to protect it from parents
and teachers, but the mere fact that they want and attempt to limit access to certain
personal information shows an understanding that information or places can be
considered private even if it is known to persons other than oneself. As they age, they
may agree that information provided to businesses or friends online should not be
available to the government without a warrant or some exception to the warrant
requirement. At the least, this new test would not require courts to consider only one
perspective on privacy when assessing Fourth Amendment protection.
This second inquiry can be criticized to the extent that it appears to allow people
to receive Fourth Amendment protection while giving access to everyone except the
government. This, however, ignores the first part of the test, which requires reasonable
limitation of access. The test should be applied in a way that reflects the function that
electronic and wireless communications serve in today’s society and grants such
communications protection similar to that given to modes of communication that were
used before modern technology existed. The second inquiry builds on the first by
focusing on the content of the communication or character of the place targeted. Even
information that is displayed or accessible to only one or two people may not be
protected if the content is such that most people would not consider granting
government access unreasonable. For example, a website that is intended to promote
criminal activity is not one that society would be willing to protect from government
intrusion.
Social networking sites provide a useful example of how courts might apply the
proposed test. A person who maintains a Facebook profile may post personal pictures
and information. If the user accepts the default privacy settings, the postings will be
available to anyone who has a Facebook account. A court could appropriately hold that
the user has not taken reasonable steps to protect the information posted on the
Facebook profile. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment would not protect the
information from a government search. Likewise, a user with thousands of “friends,”
many of whom have no personal connection with the user, may not be protected. If, on
the other hand, the user changed the profile settings so that only those designated as
“friends” had access to the profile, and only a dozen people were “friends” of the user,
a court could find that the user has taken steps to reasonably limit access to the
information. The Facebook page could be protected under the revised test, even though
it would likely fail the current “subjective expectation of privacy” test. This is
particularly true if the user—like many young users—does not consider the Facebook
page to be truly private.
The court would then have to determine whether society is willing to protect the
information from government intrusion. This inquiry allows the court to consider how
society views social networking sites in general and Facebook in particular. The court
can consider how popular the site has become with persons of all ages and its utility in
allowing people to maintain contact over large distances in a way that is not possible
with written correspondence. To the extent that a Facebook page serves the purpose
formerly filled by written or telephone correspondence, the court might conclude that
society is willing to protect such information from government intrusion. If the court
views it as a quasi-public forum intended to distribute instead of hide information, as
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may be the case for some individual and all business users, then the site content may
not be protected.
This test should not expand protection dramatically. For example, the existence of
the profile may not be protected from disclosure if that profile can be found by anyone,
even though the content may be protected if access to the content is restricted to a
smaller group of users. This distinction would be akin to the protection afforded to the
content of phone or mail communications, while leaving unprotected the addressee of a
letter or the phone number called. If, however, the profile could not be seen by the
general public (so that its existence is kept private), the proposed test could provide
more protection than currently exists; the existing test could find no subjective
expectation of privacy with respect to the existence of the profile since information
would have to be disclosed to the site sponsors in order to set up the site.
Between the extremes of users who make their profiles available to everyone and
those who limit access to very few are, perhaps, the majority of users, whose settings
allow for more than just “friends” to have access but restrict access to less than the
entire Facebook population.317 The proposed test is flexible enough to allow the courts
to evaluate each case on its own facts. The test also allows for evolution of technology
and expanded use of existing technology.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Society changes as technology changes. The lives of children today are shaped by
access to technology that allows instant, affordable communication with people all over
the world. Instead of face-to-face interactions, they develop and sustain relationships
electronically. Information on any number of subjects is available whenever and
wherever a person has access to a computer or even a cell phone. Their perceptions of
privacy are necessarily influenced by their ability to share information quickly and
easily with large groups of people. Specifically, research suggests that youth today
have a diminished expectation of privacy as compared to their elder counterparts. Their
diminished expectations can affect the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to
everyone. To counter this trend, this Article proposes a revised test for Fourth
Amendment protection that eliminates the need for a subjective expectation of
complete privacy, and only requires the courts to inquire whether society is prepared to
protect the information or space from government intrusion. The new test reflects the
reality that little is truly private in this electronic age, yet the Fourth Amendment
should not be rendered obsolete.

317. Courts may also find no Fourth Amendment protection if access is limited to “friends” but the
user’s friends number in the tens of thousands and include many people that the users has never met.

